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# **Chad: Habre at a Crossroad**

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**An Intelligence Assessment**

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*ALA 84-10111  
November 1984*

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## **Chad: Habre at a Crossroad**

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**An Intelligence Assessment**

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**Key Judgments***Information available  
as of 2 November 1984  
was used in this report.*

We believe President Habre's position is likely to erode gradually over the next year as Libya intensifies indirect pressure on his regime. Government forces probably will be unable to contain serious Libyan-sponsored dissidence on two fronts, and Habre is likely to lose popular support in the south as his troops take harsh reprisals for dissident actions. Renewed military actions probably will discourage reconciliation with the insurgents and add to the country's economic troubles.

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We believe that France, to avoid having to send combat troops back into Chad, will respond to the likely slow deterioration in Habre's position by providing additional arms aid and by pressing him to accept a dissident leader as a partner in a coalition government. Habre might accept—as a last resort—such a power-sharing arrangement to help suppress a two-front insurgency, limit opportunities for Libyan meddling among disgruntled factions, and forestall the possible future withdrawal of remaining French political, economic, and security support.

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In our judgment, the withdrawal of French and Libyan military units from Chad that occurred during November will severely test President Habre's leadership skills and survivability. He faces the prospect of a war against insurgents in the north and the south, which could dissipate scarce resources and divert his attention from the crucial tasks of political reconciliation and economic recovery. Moreover, Habre will have to work to bolster his image as a strong, pragmatic leader to retain vital French aid and the backing of moderate African leaders.

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We believe that Libya's troop withdrawal represents only a tactical change in its longstanding effort to achieve hegemony over Chad. Libyan strongman Qadhafi will continue to try to replace Habre, whom he sees as a tool of France and the United States, with a malleable, pro-Libyan leader. Libya almost certainly will increase clandestine support for insurgents to sap Habre's limited military resources and encourage economic sabotage in the south, the only economically viable area of the country. At the same time, Libya may seek to raise the cost to Western and moderate African states for their support of Habre by encouraging Chadian rebels to attack their interests in the region.

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We believe that France will resist being drawn into another direct armed intervention on Habre's behalf and instead probably will increase economic and military assistance to bolster his position. Although the French mistrust Habre, they are likely to back him as long as he serves their interest in thwarting Libyan designs and no better alternative leader appears on the scene. Paris probably will dole out its assistance, however, to encourage Habre to use military restraint and reconcile with rival factions. We believe, however, that France probably would be forced again to intervene directly on Habre's behalf to protect its credibility in franco-phone Africa if Libya is emboldened to support a rebel offensive in clear violation of the terms of the mutual withdrawal agreement. [REDACTED]

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We believe Habre's position could deteriorate rapidly should he undertake poorly planned military offensives in the north against French advice. In this scenario, Habre's boldness probably would provoke greater Libyan involvement on behalf of the rebels and lead to a series of debilitating defeats. As Habre's military control deteriorated, southerners probably would abandon the weakened regime to join the dissidents, resulting in a serious erosion of his base of support and mounting insurgency. If Libya did not further violate the withdrawal agreement, Paris might stand aside in hopes that a more pliant leader would emerge to replace Habre. Paris could then be tempted to accept Libya's proposal to install a "third force" or compromise candidate to replace Habre in hopes of placating Qadhafi. Nevertheless, prospects for the survival of a new compromise leader are dim as long as Libya supports factional violence in place of political discourse and deep-seated ethnic rivalries torpedo national reconciliation efforts. [REDACTED]

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Habre's sudden death probably would trigger greater instability and violence in N'Djamena. Any new leader would have to cope with military resistance and political infighting on the part of rival factions that could devolve into renewed civil war. Circumstances could drive Habre's hard-core northern supporters to flee to their old sanctuaries along the Sudanese border and revert to a guerrilla struggle against the new central government. [REDACTED]

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In our judgment, if Libyan-supported dissidents gained control of N'Djamena, substantial Libyan financial, logistic, and manpower support would be required to subdue local warlords—particularly Habre's fellow northerners. We believe that, even with such a Libyan investment, the new regime would be unable to unify or control the country's traditionally fractious population. Nevertheless, Tripoli could try to coerce a new regime to sign some form of security pact or a formal union agreement. We judge that, with a malleable regime in N'Djamena, Libya would intensify its effort to destabilize neighboring Sudan. [REDACTED]

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We believe that Habre and neighboring moderate states will look increasingly to Washington for additional assistance to stem Libyan encroachment, particularly if they lose confidence in France's willingness to protect them from external aggression. If the United States does not respond, moderate African states are likely to find Libyan blandishments more difficult to resist and will lend far less support for Western positions on issues that might offend Libya. In the event that Habre falls in favor of a pro-Libyan regime, African leaders would probably blame Washington as well as France for allowing Chad to become a potential base for Libyan subversion. Moreover, Tripoli probably would be emboldened to increase subversion against Sudan and in West and Central Africa. [REDACTED]

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
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**Chad: Habre at a  
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**Introduction**

The French-Libyan troop withdrawal agreement of 18 September 1984 has left Chadian President Habre at a critical juncture. He must now cope with Libyan-inspired subversion and political pressures that will place increasing demands on his leadership skills, as well as scarce military and economic resources. The 3,200 French troops not only provided military protection in the north against Libyan and Chadian dissident forces, but also allowed Habre to focus on curbing Libyan-backed southern dissidence, encouraging political reconciliation, and rehabilitating Chad's war-torn economy. The French presence also demonstrated to Chadians both inside and outside the country that Habre commanded powerful Western support and was the leader of the country's struggle against Libyan encroachment.<sup>1</sup>

campaigns.<sup>3</sup> In many cases, command authority flows from personal loyalties, rather than from a formal chain of command. Moreover, the government's frequent inability to meet the Army's payroll and provide adequate food supplies has led to morale problems and weakened combat readiness.

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In the north, Chadian commanders are planning to reoccupy northern garrisons abandoned by Libyan forces. They are reported to be confident that many Chadian rebels will rally to the government and that they can defeat the holdouts. We believe, however, that their optimism is unwarranted and that, as in the past, chronic transport and supply problems will thwart government attempts to move rapidly north beyond Faya-Largeau.

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25X1**Habre's New Challenges****Military Decisions**

Habre's most important military decision will be how best to distribute his 10,000- to 12,000-man Army<sup>2</sup> to maintain control over the country. According to the US Embassy, his task will be complicated by the Army's ethnic and regional rivalries, lack of discipline, shortages of equipment and supplies, and inability to maintain equipment. Despite French assistance in training, organizing, and equipping the Army, Habre's forces and weaponry still are more suited for traditional desert warfare than counterinsurgency

In our view, Habre faces his greatest military challenge in the south, where dissident activity appears to have increased significantly and become better organized in the last several months. The US Embassy in Bangui reports that some 6,500 Chadian refugees have fled to the Central African Republic to escape renewed violence in the south.

additional government troops were deployed to key southern garrisons and that the Army's northern Chief of Staff has been assigned to the southern command in response to the upsurge in dissidence.

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The US Embassy reports that Habre suspects that dissident leaders in Brazzaville, Congo, began to

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<sup>3</sup> US defense attache reporting indicates that the Army's arms inventory is a conglomeration of Western and Soviet—the latter having been captured from Libyan and rebel forces—infantry weapons and small vehicles. Ground forces are equipped with an estimated 78 armored personnel carriers, 24 light armored reconnaissance vehicles, 300 Toyota land rovers mounted with anti-aircraft or machineguns, 105-mm howitzers, 60 antitank weapons, 60-mm and 80-mm mortars, 6,500 small arms, and 150 trucks.

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<sup>2</sup> We estimate that actual troop strength is about 7,500. The rest consists of former dissident groups who have rallied to the government, but have not been equipped, trained, or organized into trustworthy combat units.

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coordinate the actions of various rebel groups in the south last summer. [ ]

[ ] some 3,500 well-armed southern dissidents, who returned to the bush last August after the regime was unable to meet their conditions for rallying,<sup>4</sup> were joined within a few days by elements of other commando groups. [ ]

[ ] southern rebels are coordinating their actions with dissidents in the north to increase pressure on government troops. The US Embassy believes that rebels move freely across the porous borders with northern Cameroon, Nigeria, and the Central African Republic, where they are able to reorganize and resupply their forces. [ ]

Several Western observers, including the French Ambassador in Chad, are concerned that the rebels will take advantage of the French troop withdrawal to increase military pressure on Habre in the south in the belief that his Army will be stretched too thin to mount effective retaliatory action. Moreover, Habre's fellow northern combatants, who are urging Habre to retake the north, are also pressing him to take harsh military action in the south. [ ]

[ ] Habre had ordered troops located in the south to scale down search-and-destroy operations in an effort to encourage rebels to rally to the regime. [ ]

[ ] the government's restraint probably had the opposite effect: namely, encouraging dissidents to step up operations in hope of forcing Habre to meet their political and financial demands for rallying to the regime. [ ]

### Political Ferment

Most observers agree that Chad's endemic poverty and regional, tribal, and religious cleavages make the country almost ungovernable. The regime has taken some steps in the last several months, however, to build a political infrastructure aimed at unifying the many rival groups that make up Habre's government. In July, Habre launched a new political party—the National Union for Independence and Revolution (UNIR)—that included representatives from all regions. He also reshuffled his Cabinet to provide a

<sup>4</sup> The dissidents demand full pay as newly integrated members of the military, retention of personal weapons, and free circulation throughout the country in exchange for rallying to the N'Djamena government. [ ]

### *A Country Unified Only in Name*

*The inability of successive postindependence governments in Chad to maintain internal security and national integrity has left the country susceptible to repeated foreign military interventions. An administrative unit of French Equatorial Africa during the colonial period, Chad has never been a unified country. Its 5.1 million people are divided into some 200 ethnic groups lacking a common language, religion, and history. Upon gaining independence in 1960, Chad began to fragment almost immediately. At no time has the central government's control run the full length and breadth of the country. For a quarter century, large areas of northern Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) prefecture have been outside central government jurisdiction. The unresolved struggle for control of Chad since the 1970s has occurred primarily between two rival Toubou tribesmen from the BET—Hissein Habre and Goukouni Weddeye—their factional allies, and their foreign backers.* [ ]

better ethnic and regional balance. Although southerners in the regime welcomed their enhanced political influence, little probably has changed for the bulk of their followers. Moreover, Habre's northern comrades-in-arms resent the reforms and appear determined to retain ultimate control of political power, making it unlikely that the more populous south will be successfully appeased. [ ]

### Economic Imperatives

Although northerners dominate the government, they cannot successfully rule the country without the participation of the better educated and more skilled southern civil servants and the revenues derived from the south's cotton-based economy. The presence of French troops had provided much-needed security in the south for the production of both cash and food crops. Buoyed by strong export prices, cotton output—Chad's principal cash crop—increased from 102,000 tons in 1983 to 150,000 tons in 1984, while

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sugar production rose by 22 percent and peanut production by 5 percent. The US Embassy reports that a commercial banking sector has been partially reestablished and that the principal industries—cotton and sugar processing, the national electric company, and cigarette and beer production—are operating.

The recent upsurge in dissident activity and continuing drought have disrupted the economy of the south, however, raising the specter of a poor cotton harvest and severe food shortages. The US Embassy reports that only 50 percent of the lands under cotton production last year have been cultivated this season. Government corruption, pillaging of food stocks by Army troops and insurgents, lack of storage facilities, and major transportation problems all aggravate the food problem. Despite large infusions of food aid from abroad, the US Embassy estimates a food shortfall of about 250,000 metric tons this year.

The departure of French troops, who had spent about \$500,000 a month, according to the US Embassy, will also slow economic development. Local commercial bankers indicate that they see signs of capital flight, while local businessmen are halting expansion. Moreover, the US Embassy reports that Esso<sup>5</sup> had sent advance oil exploration teams to begin drilling in the south, but plans are uncertain in view of company fears that its installations could be attacked by rebels once the French are gone.

Despite good crops, foreign assistance, and self-imposed austerity measures, the government still ran a budget deficit of about \$14.75 million and an external debt of about \$152 million in 1983. Chadian officials have expressed concern that the country could be suspended this year from the International Monetary Fund for failure to pay some \$5.6 million in arrearages on loans from the Fund. The US Embassy

<sup>5</sup> Four international oil companies conducted exploratory operations in southern Chad from 1972 until 1979, when work was suspended because of civil war. Total reserves were estimated at 200 million barrels, but additional drilling was necessary to determine the actual size and structure of the oil-bearing formations. Based on geophysical data obtained during preliminary operations, the oil companies estimate potential reserves at 500 million barrels, the minimum level necessary to reach economically viable export levels.

reports that N'Djamena can pay only half this amount and still meet essential government expenditures.

#### **Diplomatic Dilemma**

According to US Embassy reporting, Habre is under mounting pressure from France to agree to a negotiated political settlement that would broaden participation in the government to include representatives of various dissident groups in and outside the country. Preliminary talks held in Brazzaville, Congo, last month between spokesmen for Habre and Chadian dissident groups broke down, however, after Libyan-backed rebel leaders refused to recognize Habre's delegation as that of the legitimate government. In addition to the representation issue, we believe that Habre's flexibility at representing Chad in any future talks also will be constrained by fears that the French and Libyans have cut a secret deal aimed at using the reconciliation process to maneuver him from office in favor of a "third force" compromise candidate.

#### **Libyan Aims and Strategy**

We believe Tripoli's fundamental goal of installing a more malleable and pro-Libyan regime in N'Djamena is unchanged and that the troop withdrawal represents only a change of tactics. In our view, curtailing the unpopular campaign in Chad eases mounting domestic pressures on Qadhafi and enables him to repair his relations with France as part of a campaign to project a moderate image in Western Europe. At the same time, it allows him to continue clandestine aid to anti-Habre dissidents. Libya will remain entrenched in the Aozou Strip from which it can continue to provide arms and logistic support to Chadian dissidents in the north. In addition, Tripoli may sponsor terrorist attacks against Habre with Chadian dissidents, maneuver diplomatically to undermine Habre abroad, and continue to try to barter behind the scenes with France in search of a compromise candidate to replace Habre.

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Tripoli already has begun to rebuild the dissident forces in the north, which have been sapped by desertions, poor morale, tribal frictions, inadequate supplies, and inactivity. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Chadians again are being funneled via Benin to Libya for reinfiltration into northern Chad.

[REDACTED] the rebel army now has no more than 4,000 combatants and is completely dependent on the Libyans for logistic support. Nevertheless, US defense attache reporting indicates that the departing Libyans transferred additional supplies and equipment to the rebels. Moreover, Habre suspects—probably correctly—that the northern rebels will be strengthened by the clandestine presence in their ranks of Libyan advisers and foreign African mercenaries recruited by the Libyans. [REDACTED]

In our view, stepped-up Libyan financial and materiel support is largely responsible for the recent resurgence of dissident activity in the south. Chadian officials claim that Libya continues to infiltrate supplies to rebels, including the use of airdrops, and provide money to win back the allegiance of dissidents who have rallied to the regime. [REDACTED]

Libya will probably continue to sponsor terrorist attacks against the Habre regime. [REDACTED]

We expect Libya also will work to undermine Habre on the diplomatic front. US Embassy reporting indicates that Libya sent uninvited observers to the recently aborted Brazzaville reconciliation talks and tried to manipulate the conference against Habre. US Embassy officials note that the Libyan presence in

Brazzaville has grown to at least 45 personnel, largely, in our view, to foment trouble for Habre and Zairian President Mobutu, who has been Habre's principal African supporter. [REDACTED]

### French Goals and Responses

In our view, the intervention of French combat troops and aircraft to stop the Libyan and Chadian dissident advance on N'Djamena last summer was designed to reassure African leaders that Paris will honor its defense agreements against external aggression. Despite clear divisions in the French Government on how much support to give to N'Djamena, Paris appears committed to thwarting Libyan designs against Chad. We believe that, as long as Habre serves the French in this respect—without being overly provocative toward Tripoli—Paris is likely to suppress its longstanding mistrust of him and continue its support of his regime. Moreover, US Embassy reporting indicates that Paris recognizes that the Chadian President has considerable support among francophone Africans, who helped secure his recognition before the OAU as Chad's legitimate leader, and that for now he probably is the strongest Chadian leader available. [REDACTED]

At the same time, France has tried to preserve diplomatic relations and profitable commercial ties with Tripoli as leverage to temper Qadhafi's behavior. Libya provides about 6 percent of France's oil imports, while Tripoli purchases 10 percent of its weapons from French manufacturers. Although France cut off arms deliveries and the negotiation of new weapons contracts with Libya because of its intervention in Chad last year, Paris continued to train Libyan pilots and repair Libyan aircraft. [REDACTED]

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We believe the Mitterrand government almost certainly will encourage Habre to use military restraint in both the south and north. The US Embassy reports that French military officials expect Habre to move north but have counseled him to wait until the withdrawal is completed, to avoid attacks on or near the Aozou Strip, and to move only gradually to consolidate his hold on northern outposts. France also will urge Habre to continue the negotiation process with southern commando groups in hope of fostering domestic reconciliation. Moreover, Paris is likely to tie increased military and economic assistance to Habre's willingness to hold meaningful reconciliation talks with dissident groups based outside the country.

Although France hopes to avert the need in the future for another intervention of French combat troops and aircraft in Chad, under certain extreme circumstances Paris indicates it could reenter, according to the US Embassy in Paris. Mitterrand's chief African adviser, Guy Penne, has told US Embassy officers in Paris that France would send troops back into Chad if Libya sends in its troops, launches airstrikes against Habre's forces, or gives the rebels enough aid that they achieve a clear predominance. Nevertheless, he stipulated that Paris would not intervene if Libya sent limited aid to dissidents in the south or if Libyan-financed mercenaries operated in the country.

Habre relies heavily on French economic assistance, both for day-to-day government operations and reconstruction efforts. According to the US Embassy, France has already channeled about \$32.3 million in overall economic assistance to N'Djamena in 1984. French officials say that \$4.9 million was provided in direct financial aid and \$2.9 million in food aid. About \$10.25 million also was committed for development projects, including road reconstruction, health and agricultural projects, and the training of teachers and technicians.

Direct French military support for N'Djamena this year will total \$5 million, including technical and medical support, contract personnel, materiel, and uniforms. The US Embassy in Paris reports that French officials may budget some \$16-22 million in

aid after the French troop withdrawal is completed, to include about 90 military trainers, a vehicle maintenance program, and a C-130 transport aircraft plus contract pilots.

### Outlook and Scenarios

Under any scenario, we believe that Habre's agenda, in the wake of the French and Libyan departure, will be to reassert military control over the country. At the same time, he will continue to explore the possibility of achieving reconciliation with dissident groups, but only within certain well-defined limits. He will demand that his position as legitimate chief of state is protected and that control of the government is maintained by his northern faction. Moreover, Habre almost certainly will seek additional military and economic assistance from Western and moderate Arab donors. Habre's situation over the near term could evolve in several ways, none mutually exclusive.

### Slow Deterioration

This scenario—which we believe is the most likely outcome—assumes that Habre acts with restraint, that neither Libya nor France will intervene directly in Chad, and that little progress will be made toward a negotiated solution to Chad's problems. Under such circumstances, we believe Habre's hold on power would erode gradually over the next year as Libya maintains indirect military pressure in both the north and south, leaving N'Djamena hard pressed to contain strong dissidence on two fronts. Habre's response in the south probably would become increasingly intolerant and heavyhanded, causing him to lose any remaining popular southern support for his rule.

Habre's image abroad as a strong leader working for national reconciliation would erode, as the Libyans continue to use their influence with Chadian dissident leaders and left-leaning African states to prevent any political settlement acceptable to Habre. In addition, Qadhafi probably would try to erode Western and

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moderate African backing for Habre by raising the costs for their support by encouraging terrorist attacks on French and US targets in Chad and moderate pro-Habre states in the region. [REDACTED]

Should Habre's position slowly worsen over the next year, we estimate that the Mitterrand government would be reluctant to send troops back into the country as long as the fighting had the appearance of involving only Chadians. Paris, we believe, would respond to clear evidence of stepped-up Libyan support for the insurgents by providing additional arms and training to Habre's army, though not on a lavish scale. The French would also try to distance themselves from Habre's harsh pacification policies in the south, the area of Chad that most openly welcomed French colonialism and that still has an affinity for the French. [REDACTED]

#### **Rapid Deterioration**

This less likely scenario assumes that Habre takes rash military action, which provokes greater Libyan involvement on behalf of the rebels. Under such circumstances, we believe Habre's situation could deteriorate fairly rapidly if, against French advice, he undertook poorly planned offensives in the north—perhaps including attacks against dissident outposts in the vicinity of Libyan-occupied Aozou Strip—leaving his troops vulnerable in N'Djamena and the south.<sup>6</sup> Habre's boldness would alienate the French and leave him vulnerable to a series of debilitating military defeats. France would probably respond to clear Libyan violations of the withdrawal agreement by intervening directly; if, however, Libyan violations were not blatant, France might stand aside in hopes that a more pliant leader would emerge to replace Habre. [REDACTED]

We believe that French patience with Habre's apparent obstinance would wear thin, leading Paris to let him fend for himself initially. At the same time, French officials would maneuver behind the scenes to gain leverage with potential successors to help ensure that a more pliant leader would replace Habre. Paris

<sup>6</sup> Habre continues to demand that Libya relinquish control of the Aozou Strip, which he regards as sovereign Chadian territory. The US Embassy reports that Habre has expressed his willingness to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice for adjudication, rather than try to retake the area through force of arms. [REDACTED]

also would attempt to mitigate damage to its prestige in Africa by claiming that France had restored Habre's position once and that his new misfortunes were the result of his own poor judgment, over which France had no control. [REDACTED]

Tripoli, in reaction, might conclude that, because Paris had lost confidence in Habre, Libya could afford to run the risk of a more direct military role in support of the rebels. As in the past, Libyan intervention could be formally requested by dissident leader Goukouni, who would reassert his claim to be the legitimate president by right of the 1979 Lagos accords. [REDACTED]

In the event that Libya is emboldened to violate the mutual withdrawal agreement by sending in Libyan troops or fighter aircraft, or to supply the rebels with heavy arms and equipment, we believe that France would probably redeploy its forces to Chad—as it publicly has pledged to do—to protect the integrity of its security agreements with other francophone states. Paris would justify intervention under a military technical cooperation agreement signed with N'Djamena in 1976. We believe that Paris would delay this decision until the last possible moment, however, until the Libyan and dissident advance on the capital had been broadly condemned by neighboring moderate states, other Western allies, and moderate Arab countries, thus assuring broad domestic and international support. [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, if France—contrary to our expectations—did not intervene and Tripoli were able to install a new government, Qadhafi could again be tempted to try to coerce N'Djamena to sign some form of security pact or to even agree to a formal Libyan-Chad union.<sup>7</sup> In our view, however, a new

<sup>7</sup> Following the intervention of some 7,000 Libyan troops in December 1980, Tripoli announced in early January 1981 a merger agreement with Chad. Then President Goukouni apparently initially resisted Libyan pressure but finally agreed to sign the pact after Libya was rumored to have threatened his life. Within days after the pact was announced, however, Tripoli began to back down on the pact's significance in response to furious African diplomatic lobbying and protests of Chadian political leaders. Libyan forces began to pull out their troops from Chad in November 1981 after Goukouni demanded their withdrawal. [REDACTED]

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**Chronology of Foreign Interventions**

- 1960 *After independence was declared, French troops remain to administer the predominantly Muslim northern half of Chad under terms of a mutual defense treaty.*
- 1964 *French forces withdraw at the request of southern President Tombalbaye, whose forces assume control of the north.*
- 1968 *France intervenes with air force units to counter growing northern dissidence.*
- 1969 *Paris sends in 1,600-man ground force.*
- 1973 *Libya annexes Aozou Strip.*
- 1978 *France intervenes with 2,500 troops to support southern President Malloum against northern insurgents led by Habre and Goukouni.*
- 1979 *Nigeria mediates an OAU-sponsored reconciliation agreement and sends a 1,000-man peacekeeping force for three months.*
- May 1980 *France withdraws its forces after new OAU-sponsored accord provides for Congolese troops to enforce a cease-fire.*
- Novem- *Libya announces formal merger agreement*  
ber *with Chad, and, upon the request of Presi-*  
1980 *dent Goukouni, sends in 7,000 troops to*  
*bolster his regime against Habre's*  
*insurgents.*
- Novem- *Libyan forces withdrawn at request of*  
ber *N'Djamena; OAU deploys a 3,500-man*  
1981 *peacekeeping contingent made up of Nigeri-*  
*an, Senegalese, and Zairian troops to ensure*  
*order, but Habre seizes power a year later.*
- July *Libyan forces intervene in support of Gou-*  
1983 *kouni's rebels in the north; French troops*  
*enter in August in support of President*  
*Habre.*

Libyan-Chad merger would provoke serious concern and opposition among Chadians and moderate African states, who quickly would bring strong international pressure to bear on Qadhafi. Even if a Libyan unification scheme were implemented, we believe it would prove ineffective and short lived as Qadhafi tried to mollify international opinion and strong domestic Chadian opposition. [redacted]

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**Political Reconciliation**

However Habre's military situation evolves, we believe that France will search for a political solution to avert another direct intervention. In the event that Habre's position slowly deteriorates, France's carefully applied carrot-and-stick approach could convince him to participate in some form of power-sharing arrangement to forestall the withdrawal of French backing and defuse the threat of a two-front war. In our view, there are several potential rebel leaders who could bring broader support to a coalition government headed by Habre. [redacted]

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In the less likely event that Habre's position rapidly deteriorates resulting in the loss of French support, Paris might be tempted to accept Libya's longstanding proposal for a "third force" or compromise candidate to replace Habre. Under this less likely eventuality, the French could calculate that a new leader would help placate the Libyans and, at the same time, prove more pliant and subject to French influence than Habre. [redacted]

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Under either an Habre-led coalition government or a "third force" arrangement, however, deep-seated ethnic animosity almost certainly would undermine its durability. Habre would be reluctant to participate in a coalition government, fearing that such an arrangement was the first step in a French effort to replace him. No single dissident leader would be able to persuade all rebel groups to lay down their arms and rally to a coalition government. Moreover, the risk of violence would increase as Habre's fellow hardline northerners maneuvered to retain the upper hand militarily and protect Habre from potential coup attempts. [redacted]

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**The Rebel Government and Army**

*The Libyan-backed Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) has never been more than an uneasy amalgamation of diverse and traditionally hostile factions united solely by their common antipathy for Chadian President Habre and desire to share the spoils of governing Chad. Since last summer, the GUNT has been torn by increased factionalism and animosity toward its Libyan mentors, according to US Embassy reporting. Only three of the six groups that comprise the GUNT retain any political or military significance:*

- *The People's Armed Forces (FAP), a faction of northern Toubou tribesmen led by GUNT President Goukouni. A declining military force, the FAP derives what remains of its influence from Goukouni's titular role in the GUNT. We believe, however, that Goukouni is essentially a Libyan puppet with little following inside Chad and in danger of being dumped by Qadhafi as soon as it suits Libyan purposes.*
- *The Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR), an Arab-dominated faction of central Chadians led by GUNT Defense Minister Rakhis Manani. The CDR maintains close ties to Libya and contributes the bulk of the GUNT's fighting force known as the National Liberation Army (ANL). Former CDR Chief Achiek Ibn Oumar, once touted as Libya's choice to replace Habre, is frequently mentioned by Chadian observers as a possible "third force" compromise candidate who would be acceptable to both Libya and France.*
- *The Armed Forces of Chad (FAT), led by GUNT Vice President Kamougue, is composed of southerners and no longer contributes significantly to the ANL. Kamougue recently formed a breakaway group in Congo after he was accused of corruption by GUNT officials. Most of the former FAT fighters operate in the south as separate commando groups, although some remain close to Kamougue.*

Tripoli is likely to try to create tensions in a coalition government by wooing various leaders with bribes and promises of support to either work against Habre or abandon the regime. Also, Tripoli might increase aid to rebel groups that remained outside the government—of which there would be many with any coalition that included Habre. [REDACTED]

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In the unlikely event that Paris agrees to Tripoli's scheme to install a "third force" or compromise candidate in N'Djamena, Habre's hardcore followers probably would go on a rampage in the capital to resist the installation of a new government, before fleeing to old sanctuaries in the east and reverting to guerrilla warfare. Any new leader would have to cope with political infighting or even military resistance among other rival factions vying for greater influence. To survive, a government with such a limited constituency would require large amounts of outside military and economic support. France, realizing such a leader could never unify the fractious population, probably would be reluctant to provide significant assistance or become closely identified with the fragile regime. Moreover, Qadhafi almost certainly would try to maneuver such a leader to Libya's advantage in an effort to install a staunchly pro-Libyan regime. [REDACTED]

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**Chad Without Habre**

If Habre dies in office, we believe that a succession struggle would ensue among his fellow northerners. Unless the northern tribesmen were able to agree quickly on a replacement, the country probably would sink into renewed civil war as factions from all areas of the country vied for leadership. The Army probably would splinter into various factional militias, leaving no one group in full control. [REDACTED]

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The US Embassy reports that one potential successor to Habre might be Taher Guinassou, Minister of Animal and Water Resources and one of Habre's fierce desert fighters. He is a Muslim from the north and would be acceptable to other members of Habre's inner circle, which is dominated by members of the northern-based Toubou ethnic group. Nevertheless, the Embassy reports that Guinassou lacks Habre's

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charisma, shrewdness, and leadership abilities, and we doubt that he would be able to hold the ethnically fractious country together for long. [ ]

In addition to finding a successor to Habre, northern hardliners would face the crucial dilemma of retaining French support. We believe that Paris would mistrust any northern leader, calculating that, like Habre, he would prove difficult to influence and have similar problems consolidating support among southerners. Nevertheless, if Habre's followers could agree on a replacement, we believe Paris probably would back the new regime initially in hopes of forestalling a takeover by Libyan-backed dissidents. Some 2,000 to 4,000 of Habre's hardcore supporters, under new leadership and with French backing, probably would be able to retain military control over N'Djamena and some other areas of the country, at least for the short term. [ ]

In the event that the northerners were unable to agree on a successor and convince Paris to continue its support, rebel forces with Libyan backing probably would gain the upper hand. The remnants of Habre's hardcore northern combatants would then be forced back to their old stronghold in the Biltine prefecture bordering Sudan and its cross-border sanctuaries, where they would regroup and begin guerrilla operations against the new government (see map). [ ]

If Libyan-supported dissident forces were to gain control of the capital, the problems of restoring order and subduing local warlords throughout the rest of the country—including Habre's rebellious fighters in the east—would require substantial Libyan financial, logistic, and manpower support. In our judgment, a Libyan-sponsored regime probably would not be able to unify or control Chad. Nevertheless, should Qadhafi gain such a foothold in Chad, he would be in a position to step up efforts to destabilize neighboring Sudan, and put pressure on Niger and the CAR to reduce French influence. [ ]

#### Implications for the United States

In our judgment, the Habre regime is critically dependent on continued French military and political backing to ensure its survival. Although government forces probably could cope with a limited surge in

Libyan-supported dissidence in the south and east, they would be hard pressed without French support to repel another direct Libyan incursion in the north or contain strong dissidence on two fronts. Moreover, Habre is totally dependent on Paris for military equipment and supplies, training, and support in forming an integrated national Army. [ ]

If Habre's position slowly deteriorates under the pressure of Libyan subversion and limited French support—the most likely scenario—N'Djamena will look to the United States as the only other alternative for additional assistance to bolster his regime. The United States provided about \$17 million in economic and development assistance and \$2 million in military assistance to Habre in the fiscal year 1984 as well as \$25 million in emergency military assistance in mid-1983. Washington had budgeted \$13.7 million in economic and development assistance, \$5 million in the military assistance program, and \$150,000 for military training for fiscal year 1985. [ ]

If France appeared hesitant to support Habre, neighboring African states—especially Niger and Sudan—probably would look to Washington to provide him with emergency military aid and to exert political pressure on France to intervene on his behalf. They would probably hope that a larger role for the United States in Chad, in cooperation with France, could contain Libyan encroachment and strengthen regional security. [ ]

If France and the United States were not perceived to be responsive by concerned Africans and Habre fell in favor of a pro-Libyan leader—our second scenario—we believe that neighboring Africans would be quick to blame Washington as well as Paris for failing to ensure a moderate-led Chad that does not serve as a possible base for Libyan subversion. Tripoli, in turn, would be emboldened to step up subversion against Sudan and in West Africa. Unsure of Western security support, weaker moderate African regimes would seek to lower their political profile, find Libyan blandishments more difficult to resist, and lend far less support to French and US positions on issues that

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might offend Qadhafi. Moderate African dependence on French economic aid, US food assistance, and Western-backed institutions like the IMF, however, would provide for continued, albeit difficult, ties and eventual opportunities to repair the damage to US and French interests.

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Habre's inclusion of dissident leaders in a coalition government or the installation of a compromise candidate would be less risky for US interests than if he were removed from the political scene in favor of a compromise leader. We are dubious, however, that either form of political reconciliation under this third scenario would significantly advance prospects for achieving a true government of national unity, the cessation of hostilities, and curtailment of Libyan meddling

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Habre's untimely death, our fourth scenario, would create a large and difficult-to-fill leadership vacuum that would be likely to unravel US efforts to stabilize Chad under moderate, anti-Libyan rule. Chad probably would quickly revert to full-fledged civil war for control of N'Djamena.

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## Appendix

### Key Dissident Leaders



**President Goukouni Queddei.** Goukouni—Chad's former president from November 1979 until June 1982 when Habre's forces entered N'Djamena—controls the People's Armed Forces (FAP), a faction drawn from the Teda, who form the larger of the two branches of the Toubou people. Goukouni, 40, has a long record of close Libyan ties and over the past decade has been easily manipulated by Tripoli. Essentially a simple warrior who was born in Zouar, he is a devout Muslim with some secondary education. He has proved an indecisive leader whose decisions tend to reflect the views of the last strong advocate who has seen him on a particular matter.

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**Vice President Wadal Abdul Kadar Kamougue.** Kamougue, 45, a southern Sara tribesman born in Gabon and raised in Moundou, serves as vice president in the GUNT. He is regarded as a corrupt opportunist who has accepted Libyan largess in hopes of regaining control over Chad's non-Muslim south. As the south's onetime military strongman, he reportedly exploited the region for personal gain but still commands the loyalty of some elements of his old factional Army, the Armed Forces of Chad (FAT). He has remained in Congo, unlike other GUNT leaders who are on the scene in northern Chad. Recently, Kamougue has been rumored to be upset with the Libyans and possibly amenable to exploring reconciliation with Habre.

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**Former Minister of National Defense Acheikh ibn Oumar.** Acheikh, in his mid-to-late thirties, is an ethnic Arab from Abeche in eastern Chad. He became prominent within the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR)—made up of Arab Muslims from central Chad—upon the death of Acyl Ahmat in June 1982. The CDR was at that time the second-largest armed faction in Chad after Kamougue's forces in the former Goukouni government. It traditionally has received large amounts of Libyan arms and funding. Acheikh, an avowed Marxist, has been rumored off and on to be Qadhafi's favorite to head a new government in N'Djamena, while at the same time he is said to be held in high regard among some French officials.

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**General Negue Djogo.** General Djogo, 52, former commander in chief of the GUNT's National Army of Liberation, moved to Brazzaville, Congo, last summer following disputes with other rebel leaders over command responsibilities. He has a reputation as an effective decisionmaker and organizer who is popular among his troops. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Djogo was largely responsible for soothing ethnic tensions among the rebel ranks. Nevertheless, he reportedly has tried to undermine his longtime rival and fellow southerner Colonel Kamougue by fueling discontent among Kamougue's followers. [REDACTED]

Djogo is a Sara tribesman of both Catholic and Muslim parentage. He served as vice president and chief of staff in former President Lol's short-lived government in 1979 and as a Cabinet minister under President Malloum from 1975 to 1976. After 10 years in the French Army and study at the French officer candidate school, Djogo proved himself a courageous and competent soldier. During earlier periods of unrest in southern Chad, he tried to play a peacemaker role between Muslims, southern Catholics, and animists. [REDACTED]

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